Saturday, July 14, 2007

Iraqi Report: Success And Failure

The White House and Congress agreed to get the Iraqi government to meet 18 targets and the interim report that was released by the White House shows mixed results.

The benchmarks that are considered saticfactorily completed include the following:
To have the Iraqi government form a commmittee to review the constitution; and the committee has been formed, but the review is not done. To establish a process to form and implement semi-autonomous regions; and procedures are in place, but it's unclear whether more regions will be added. To establish political, media, economic, and service committees to support security plan; and the steering committee meets weekly to discuss topics. Subcommittees have formed, but they vary in effectiveness. To provide three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support operations in Baghdad; and the Iraqi government has provided the equivalent of three brigades, but staffing levels are a concern. To protect the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature; but Shiite factions are feuding. Women work closely with one another, often across party lines. To allocate and spend $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects; and the Iraqi government has only spent about $1.4 billion in 2006. The oil ministry hasn't made a real effort to spend its capital budget. True success depends on improving delivery of services. To ensure that the Baghdad security plan will not provide safe haven for outlaws, regardless of sectarian or political affiliation; and United States commanders say they're satisfied with their ability to target any extremist group. Security forces have been able to clear some areas around Baghdad. To establish joing security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad; and more than 60 stations are in Baghdad, and 30 more are planned. Increased interaction with locals has reduced violence.

The benchmarks that showed mixed results are, to establish an electoral commission, set up provincial councils, and their authorities, and set a date for elections; and a commission is formed. A law establishing provincial elections is drafted. Still trying to agree on council authorities, but no date has been set for elections. To reduce the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminate militia control of local security; and the militia presence is still strong and far-reaching, and there has been some decrease in sectarian violence, but too early to tell whether it will continue.

The benchmarks that were judged as having unsatisfactorily results are, to divide oil revenues among Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish factions; While Kurds and Shiites have agreed on how to do this, but Sunnis are balking, which has had the effect of reducing Iraqi's confidence in the government. To reintegrate former Baath Party members into Iraq society; exclude democracy opponents; and this is among the most divisive political issues, and compromise is extremely difficult. There have been competing conceptions of justice and accountability. To give Iraqi commanders authority to execute the security plan and make tactical and operational decisions; and while Iraqi and coalition forces have authority to go after insurgents and militias, but concerns about negative political influence continue at various levels. To ensure that Iraqi security forces provide even handed law enforcement; but some individual units are not complying, and performance is generally adequate when teamed with coalition forces. To increase the number of Iraqi security force units capable of operating independently; and with slow and steady improvement, though the Bush administration is concerned about sectarian leanings of some national police units. To ensure Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces; but accusations of wrongdoing are not being adequately addressed by the Iraqi government. As a result, security forces don't operate in a professional, non-sectarian way.

And lastly, there are two benchmarks that are too early to assess, and they are: To pass a law giving amnesty to former members of the ruling Baath Party, but conditions for amnesty for those who have fought against the Iraqi government since 2003 do not exist. Also violence is extensive, and various groups aren't willing to reconcile. To enact and implement law on militia disarmament so security forces are loyal and accountable; but there is disagreement on whether the law is needed now. No armed group has committed to disarmament. The United Nations and others have reservations about timing.

So as the surge completes its' first full month since all of the troops that were requested have arrived, we cannot see if this is going to go well or not. We know that there shall be a Congressional report that General Petraeus must give them by September 15th, so until then, it looks like more troops will die and we shall see if the surge does any good whatsoever. For our troops sake, I hope something good will come of this, but it looks more doubtful each day as the violence continues!

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